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Parenting Rights in California: Marriage
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By JENNIFER BRYAN*
Introduction
DNA TESTING RESTS ON THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCI-
PLE that each individual, except for identical twins, has a unique ge-
netic composition.1 Thanks to scientific advancement, DNA testing
generally provides a probability of paternity greater than 99.9%.2 Pa-
ternity can be established prior to birth through chorionic villus sam-
pling when the fetus is between ten and thirteen weeks old, or by
amniocentesis between fourteen and twenty-four weeks of pregnancy.3
The buccal swab is the most common technique to establish paternity
post-birth and is painless and non-invasive.4 This method accounts for
more than 80% of all samples collected.5 Couples who prefer to avoid
laboratory testing can order paternity testing kits online and adminis-
ter them in the privacy of their homes for as little as $165.6
In light of the scientific and technological advances in paternity
testing, this Note asserts that California law requires reform to protect
the biological father’s paternal rights to establish a relationship with
* J.D., University of San Francisco School of Law (2012); B.A. New School
University (2003).
1. See Noel Myricks, DNA Testing and Child Support: Can the Truth Really Set You Free?,
17 AM. J. FAM. L. 31, 31 (2003); Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of DNA Identi-
fication Evidence, 84 A.L.R. 4th 313, 319 (1991).
2. Myricks, supra note 1, at 31.
3. See Aaron B. Caughey et al., Chorionic Villus Sampling Compared With Amniocentesis
and the Difference in the Rate of Pregnancy Loss, 108 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 612, 612–16
(2006).
4. Myricks, supra note 1, at 31.
5. See CAL. DEP’T OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT PROGRAM GLOSSARY
(2010), available at http://www.childsup.ca.gov/Portals/0/resources/docs/glossary.pdf.
6. See, e.g., PROPHASE GENETICS, http://prophase-genetics.com/ (last visited Apr. 6,
2012).
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his child. Part I of this Note reviews California’s application of the
marital presumption and the policies behind it. Part II assesses the
best interests of the child, specifically the child’s right to know his or
her origin. Part III explores and offers parenting alternatives.
I. Marital Presumption
Despite the ability to determine biological parentage by greater
than 99.9% accuracy through DNA testing, California still relies heav-
ily on the marital presumption, a judicially created doctrine dating
back to English common law that presumes a husband is the biologi-
cal father of any child born into the marriage.7 Justice Scalia has de-
scribed this presumption as “a fundamental principle of common
law.”8 Lower courts have deemed it “one of the strongest presump-
tions known to the law.”9 California originally codified this presump-
tion of paternity in 1872.10 The presumption, still in effect today,
designates that “the child of a wife cohabitating with her husband,
who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of
the marriage.”11
A non-marital father may also be a presumptive father under Cali-
fornia law if he marries, or attempts to marry, the mother after the
birth of the child, or receives the child into his home and openly
holds the child out as his natural child.12 The courts analyze “receiv-
ing” and “holding out” separately and from the child’s perspective.13
This presumption, however, is rebuttable14 since there can only be
one presumed father.15 If two or more conflicting presumptions, or
presumed fathers, arise, then the presumption that is factually based
on “the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”16
When a man might be the father of a child but either his biologi-
cal paternity has not been established or he has not achieved pre-
sumed father status under the California statute, he is known as an
7. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *156, *455, *459.
8. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
9. Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1053–54 (Pa. 1999).
10. Batya F. Smernoff, Comment, California’s Conclusive Presumption of Paternity and the
Expansion of Unwed Fathers’ Rights, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 337, 341 (1996).
11. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2010) (emphasis added).
12. Id. § 7611.
13. In re Salvador M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705, 708 (Ct. App. 2003).
14. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611.
15. See In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 937 (Cal. 2002).
16. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b)
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“alleged father.”17 A “biological” or “natural” father has established
his biological paternity but has not achieved presumed father status
under California law.18 The statute vests presumed fathers with
greater parental rights than alleged or biological fathers.19
It is important to note, however, that a child is “born into” the
mother’s home, not the father’s.20 This means that a biological fa-
ther’s wife cannot become a presumed mother under a gender-neu-
tral reading of the California Family Code.21 In other words, a
biological father’s wife cannot receive presumed mother status under
the marital presumption, nor can she achieve it by “receiving” and
“holding out.”22
A. Policy Considerations Behind the Marital Presumption
The marital presumption arose at common law to advance two
main policy goals.23 First, it served to protect children from the bur-
den of being defined as “illegitimate,” a designation that historically
carried legal and social consequences.24 Second, it aimed to preserve
the traditional family model.25 Children born out of wedlock had to
deal with the social stigma attached to their illegitimate status.26
In recent years, the Supreme Court has overturned many laws
that discriminate against illegitimate children under the Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process clauses of the United States Constitution.27
17. Francisco G. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679, 687 (Ct. App. 2001).
18. Id.
19. In re Zacharia D., 862 P.2d 751, 762 (Cal. 1993).
20. Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297 (Ct. App. 2006). This case operated in the
reverse of the typical family case. When the child was one month old the biological mother
relinquished physically custody of the child to the father and his wife. Id. at 299. The bio-
logical mother was not married to the biological father at the time she gave birth. See id.
The biological father and his wife raised the baby until the biological mother filed a peti-
tion seeking to establish a parental relationship, visitation, and support. Id. at 298–300.
The father attempted to join his wife in the suit claiming she was a presumed mother
under the marital presumption by receiving the child into her home and holding the baby
out as her own. Id. at 300.
21. Id. at 310 (finding that the wife of the biological father who conceived the child
with another woman is not similarly situated to a man whose wife was impregnated by
another man because biology dictates that the mother must carry the child).
22. See id.
23. Laura W. Morgan, Child Support Fifty Years Later, 42 FAM. L.Q. 365, 372 (2008).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In Levy, the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional a Louisiana statute that denied illegitimate children the right to recover
for the wrongful death of their mother. Id. at 70–72. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
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Courts subject laws that discriminate against children based on their
illegitimacy to intermediate scrutiny, which means that the state must
prove the law is substantially related to achieving an important govern-
ment interest.28
The “traditional family” that the marital presumption aims to pre-
serve has changed. As one court accurately described, “the so-called
nuclear family, on which many of our paternity laws are based, now
resembles more of an electron field.”29 In 2009, 41% of all children
born in the United States were born to unwed mothers.30 Although
this figure signifies a decrease from 2008, the number of non-marital
childbirths has grown steadily over the last thirty years.31 Non-marital
births accounted for 33.2% of all births in 2000, compared to only
18.4% in 1980.32 Although unmarried families account for almost half
of all children born in the United States and represent the basis for a
new definition of the traditional family, the marital presumption does
not apply to them.
Case law articulates a third legislative policy consideration behind
codifying the marital presumption: “a desire to have an individual
rather than the state assume the financial burden of supporting the
child.”33 With the advancement of medical technology and the ability
to obtain conclusive paternity determinations, mothers can easily as-
certain a biological father for the purposes of obtaining child support.
Accordingly, the courts can effectuate the policy goal of achieving pa-
rental financial responsibility without reliance on the marital
presumption.
406 U.S. 164 (1972), the Court held that workmen’s compensation benefits related to the
death of their father must be paid to dependent children, even if they were born out of
wedlock and were never formally acknowledged by their father. Id. at 173–76. In Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam), the Supreme Court overturned a state law that
denied non-marital children paternal child support holding “once a State posits a judicially
enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there
is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child
simply because its natural father has not married its mother.” Id. at 536–38. The Court
concluded: “For a State to do so is illogical and unjust.” Id. at 538 (internal quotation
omitted).
28. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1982).
29. See Lisa I. v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 927, 938–39 (Ct. App. 2005) (describ-
ing how parentage law is still in its evolutionary stage and the legislature is free to change
the presumed father and standing laws if it chooses).
30. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2010, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Nov. 30,
2011, at 1, 1–2, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr60/nvsr60_01.pdf.
31. Id. at 8.
32. Id.
33. In re Marriage of B., 177 Cal. Rptr. 429, 432 (Ct. App. 1981).
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California has gone to great lengths to ensure the collection of
child support from biological fathers. One California court held that a
biological father owed child support even when the obligor was under
the age of consent at the time of conception and had been a victim of
statutory rape.34 A biological father seeking to hold a mother liable
for fraud, based on allegedly false representations regarding the
mother’s use of contraception, will not have an actionable tort that
allows him to make her assume his child support payments.35
California, as mandated by Congress, (1) requires employers to
garnish the wages of parents who owe child support, (2) provides for
the imposition of liens against the property of defaulting support obli-
gors, and (3) deducts unpaid support obligations from federal and
state income tax refunds.36 California also requires that community
property, quasi-community property, and separate property be used to
support a child “in the proportions the court determines are just.”37
Through these safeguards, the state has adequate means to collect
child support and prevent a parent from defaulting. Because a biolog-
ical parent can be conclusively determined, California can ensure that
parents meet child support obligations without reliance on the marital
presumption.
B. California Cases Applying the Marital Presumption
The marital presumption has counterintuitively resulted in the
denial of parental rights to biological fathers who are ready, willing,
and able to love, nurture, and raise their genetic offspring. This is true
even when the biological father attains the level of presumed father
status in the California court system. For instance, in the landmark
case Michael H. v. Gerald,38 a biological father initiated an action for a
judicial determination of paternity over a child who had been born to
a married woman. The California Supreme Court dismissed the action
and held (and the United States Supreme Court affirmed) that be-
cause the child had been born to a married woman, the California law
conclusively presumed her husband to be the father’s child, even
though DNA testing conclusively established that genetic paternity did
not exist between the child and the mother’s husband.39
34. See San Luis Obispo County v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 844–46 (Ct. App.
1996).
35. See Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1980).
36. Morgan, supra note 23, at 367.
37. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4008 (West 2012).
38. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
39. Id. at 114, 131–32.
576 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
The biological father, Michael H., had an established relationship
with the child, who called him “Daddy” and even lived in his home for
eleven months.40 Michael claimed that, as matter of substantive due
process, the mother’s marriage was not a state interest sufficient to
terminate his parental rights.41 His argument was based on the asser-
tion that a biological father “has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in his relationship with his child.”42 The Supreme Court reit-
erated that in order for an interest to be protected by the Due Process
Clause, it must be “fundamental,” or “rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people.”43
The Court emphasized the traditional values of the family and
the role of the marital presumption in preserving the stability of the
family unit,44 and it declined to expand the definition of family to
include the mother’s lover, stating that the relationship is not a “tradi-
tionally respected relationship” that warrants constitutional protec-
tion.45 The Court found that our society traditionally accords respect
to a family unit typified by the marital family but may also recognize
households of unmarried parents and their children.46 Moreover, the
Court determined that expansion of the concept of family beyond
that definition would “bear no resemblance to traditionally respected
relationships—and will thus cease to have any constitutional
significance[.]”47
Later, in Rodney F. v. Karen M.,48 a non-marital father failed in his
attempt to rebut the marital presumption even though he and the
mother cohabitated during the time of conception and genetic testing
showed a 99.5% probability that he was the biological father.49 Rod-
ney F. filed for physical and legal custody within one month of the
child’s birth and argued that the marital presumption worked to allow
the mother to unilaterally deprive him of presumed father status.50
He claimed he had made every effort to take the child into his home
40. See id. at 123 n.3, 143–44.
41. Id. at 121.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 122 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
44. Michael H. v. Gerald, 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
45. See id. at 123 n.3.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Ct. App. 1998).
49. Id. at 404–05. The mother had rented an apartment and then a house with the
biological father but was simultaneously cohabitating with her husband, who was neither
impotent nor sterile. Id.
50. Id. at 403.
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and to treat her as his own but was thwarted by the mother and her
husband.51 In response, the California court of appeal opined that the
presumption “would be of little value if a parent could not act unilat-
erally” to prevent a third party from interfering.52
The mother in that case had also filed for dissolution twice in the
two years prior to the child’s birth.53 The very existence of the action
before the court caused it to question the familial stability the deci-
sion sought to preserve.54 The court stated: “[I]t may serve no good
purpose and may not be in the best interest of the child to create what
in essence is a fictional family.”55 It further acknowledged it could be
beneficial to the child to know her biological father, and that there
was no reason to believe the “integrity of the family” would be in jeop-
ardy when all parties were aware of the true genetic ties.56 The court
was again unwilling to renegotiate the balance of familial rights to in-
clude an unmarried, biological father, even on facts that seemed to
satisfy the courts’ concerns in previous cases.57
In Dawn D. v. Superior Court of Riverside City,58 the marital pre-
sumption withstood another constitutional challenge.59 The boyfriend
of a married woman who had been cohabitating with the woman at
the time of conception, but not at the time she gave birth, brought a
due process claim alleging that he had a right to parent his child.60 In
granting the boyfriend standing, the court found that because he had
demonstrated a complete commitment to his parental responsibilities,
he therefore had a due process right that required balancing against
the state’s interest in enforcing the marital presumption.61
Nevertheless, the Dawn D. court found that the boyfriend’s due
process right to parent his biological child did not overcome the mari-
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 401.
54. Rodney F. v. Karen M., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 404 (Ct. App. 1998).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 405.
57. See id.
58. 952 P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1998).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1140–41.
61. Id. at 1141. To raise the biological, non-marital father to presumed father status,
the court relied on its holding in Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992). Dawn D.,
952 P.2d at 1141. The Kelsey S. court held that “[i]f an unwed father promptly comes for-
ward and demonstrates full commitment to his parental responsibilities—emotional, finan-
cial, and otherwise—his federal constitutional right to due process prohibits the
termination of his parental relationship absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent.” 823
P.2d at 1236.
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tal presumption. The decision explained that a biological father’s
“mere desire” to establish a personal relationship with his child is not
a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.62
By choosing not to recognize a constitutionally protected liberty inter-
est in establishing a parental relationship with a child born to another
man’s wife, the court extinguished the non-marital father’s due
process claim, and awarded another triumph to the marital
presumption.63
More than a decade later, in 2010, a California court of appeal
heard H.S. v. Superior Court,64 in which a woman became pregnant
during the course of an extramarital affair, while estranged from her
husband.65 The biological father visited at the hospital and signed a
voluntary declaration of paternity (“VDOP”).66 When the mother’s
husband found out about the birth of the child, the spouses re-
united.67 The mother then rescinded the VDOP, which was voidable
because the mother was married to a man other than the signatory at
the time it was signed.68 At first, the couple allowed the non-marital
father to visit with the child for two hours twice a month.69 After the
husband became uncomfortable with this situation, the couple ended
visitation upon advice from counsel that they had no obligation to
allow visitation.70
After the mother and her husband ended the biological father’s
visitation, he filed a petition to establish paternity and requested ge-
netic testing, visitation, and support.71 The appellate court reversed
the trial court’s order for genetic testing, finding that the former boy-
friend lacked standing to bring the case because he needed to at least
be the presumptive father.72 The court held that when a child is born
to a married woman, there is no basis on which to find the non-mari-
tal father the presumed father.73 On that basis the appellate court
62. Dawn D., 952 P.2d at 1144–45.
63. Id. at 1146.
64. 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723 (Ct. App. 2010).
65. Id. at 724–25.
66. Id. at 725; a VDOP is a document completed by unmarried parents to establish
legal parentage of a child. Establishing Parentage/Paternity, CAL. COURTS, JUD. BRANCH CAL.,
http://courts.ca.gov/1201.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
67. H.S., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 725.
68. See id. at 725, 727.
69. Id. at 725.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 727.
73. H.S., 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 727 (Ct. App. 2010).
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granted the wife’s motion to dismiss the case.74 The case reinforces
the legal superiority of presumptive father status over biological father
status.
As recently as 2011, in Neil S. v. Mary L.,75 a California court de-
nied, for lack of standing, a biological, non-marital father’s petition
for custody and visitation rights regarding a pair of twins whom he
had conceived with a married woman.76 The biological father at-
tempted to challenge the constitutionality of the marital presumption
both on its face and as applied.77
In making his case for presumptive fatherhood, the biological fa-
ther claimed that his relationship with his children began before the
children were born, when he attended prenatal care appointments
with the mother and sang and talked to his unborn children.78 He
also asserted that the mother and husband obstructed his ability to
“receive” the children into his home and emphasized his efforts to
“hold out” the children as his own, including sharing the news with
his family and independently filing a VDOP in order to see and sup-
port his children.79
What made this case unique, however, was that the biological fa-
ther made a plausible argument that there were two intact families
available to raise the twins.80 The biological father’s wife and parents
expressed a desire to help raise the twins.81 The court took little inter-
est in the biological father’s own family, stating that its concern was
the “existence and nature of the child’s relationship with the putative
father,” the wife’s husband.82
The court acknowledged the biological father’s “considerable ef-
forts” to receive the children into his home and to hold them out as
his own but denied him presumed father status and dismissed the case
due to a lack of standing.83 The constitutional challenges were also,
once again, unsuccessful, and the court upheld the marital presump-
tion as constitutional.84
74. Id.
75. 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51 (Ct. App. 2011).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 53.
78. Id. at 54.
79. Id. at 55.
80. See id.
81. Neil S. v. Mary L., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 55 (Ct. App. 2011).
82. Id. at 61.
83. Id. at 57–58.
84. See id. at 58–63.
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C. Limitations on the Marital Presumption
Few cases have placed restrictions on the marital presumption. In
2000, a California court of appeal held, in Brian C. v. Ginger K.,85 that
where a biological father had an established relationship with his
child, it would be unconstitutional to rely on the marital presumption
to automatically override that relationship.86 In 2004, in agreement
with the Brian C. opinion, the court reaffirmed that the marital pre-
sumption does not control when the biological father has established
an actual relationship with the child.87
It is difficult to reconcile these cases with the courts’ longstanding
tradition of enforcing the marital presumption instead of biological
parentage.88 In many of the cases in which courts upheld the marital
presumption, there was an established parent-child relationship in
place between the biological father and the child, or at the very least,
the biological father had attempted to establish a relationship but had
been denied the opportunity to do so.89 It seems to offend the Consti-
tution to allow a biological father’s legal right to raise his child to
depend on whether a married couple allows him the opportunity to
form the necessary parent-child relationship.
The ability to procreate is a fundamental right protected by the
United States Constitution.90 It seems inconceivable that this right
does not encompass the opportunity to raise one’s offspring. A funda-
mental right to “bear and beget” a child means nothing without the
succeeding right to actively participate in that child’s life. Raising a
child necessarily follows the birth of a child and is inherent in the
fundamental right of procreation. This right should not be subject to
the whims of an ex-lover or without a more fact-intensive inquiry and
determination of the child’s best interest.91
The marital presumption has also been used in the reverse: by a
non-marital, biological father as a vehicle to avoid involvement with
85. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294 (Ct. App. 2000).
86. Id. at 310.
87. Craig L. v. Sandy S., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606, 614–15 (Ct. App. 2004).
88. See supra Part I.B.
89. See, e.g., H.S. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723 (Ct. App. 2010).
90. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The state of Oklahoma sterilized ha-
bitual criminals, persons who had been convicted of two or more crimes amounting to a
felony involving moral turpitude. Id. at 536. The Supreme Court held the right to procre-
ate was a fundamental right calling procreation one of the “basic civil rights of man” and
“fundamental to our very existence.” Id. at 541.
91. Best interest of the child is the standard courts use to decide what types of ser-
vices, actions, and orders will best serve the child in custody determinations. See CAL. FAM.
CODE § 3020 (West 2010).
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support obligations to a child born to a married woman.92 For exam-
ple, in County of Orange v. Leslie B.,93 a woman who was unaware that
she was pregnant, filed for divorce from her husband.94 The preg-
nancy resulted from an extramarital affair with a married man named
Leslie.95 The divorce became final three months before the woman
gave birth, and, as a result, the dissolution petition stated that no chil-
dren belonged to the marriage.96 When the Orange County District
Attorney sought to establish paternity and collect child support from
Leslie, he alleged that the child could not be his because the child was
conclusively presumed to be the child of the marriage.97
In this kind of situation, California courts look at the objectives
behind the marital presumption: preservation of the integrity of the
family unit, protection of the child from the stigma associated with
illegitimacy, and the promotion of individual rather than state respon-
sibility for child support.98 When application of the presumption did
not further these policies, the court opted not to apply it and noted
that to do so would “lead to an absurd result that defies reason and
common sense.”99 It concluded that use of the marital presumption
on this set of facts would “rely upon a fiction to establish a legal fact
which we know to be untrue, in order to protect policies which in this
case do not exist.”100 Accordingly, the court named Leslie as the
child’s legal father even though the child was conceived during the
course of the mother’s marriage to another man.101 It is worth noting
that the husband never accepted the child into his home, did not es-
tablish a relationship with her, nor even knew about her existence
until thirteen years after her birth, when the District Attorney moved
to establish paternity and he was joined to the proceedings by the bio-
logical father.102
92. See generally County of Orange v. Leslie B., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797 (Ct. App. 1993).
93. 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 797 (Ct. App. 1993).
94. See id. at 798.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 799.
99. County of Orange v. Leslie B., 17 Cal. Rptr. 797, 801 (Ct. App. 1993).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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D. The Legal Tie that Binds: When Disestablishment Is not an
Option
With the introduction of laboratory and home paternity kits, a
husband who questions his wife’s fidelity, or more importantly, his
child’s paternity, can easily obtain conclusive answers, with or without
his wife’s consent. A surprising result may prompt him to not only
divorce his adulterous spouse, but also to seek to disestablish paternity
and end his legal obligation to the child. Certain states, such as Mary-
land,103 Georgia,104 Ohio,105 and Virginia106 have enacted legislation
allowing men to disestablish paternity and end their obligation to con-
tinue making support payments upon discovery of scientific evidence
that precludes their paternity.107 These statutes operate under the
proposition that a parent’s duty to support his or her child derives
from a biological connection, and without this connection, support
obligations should cease.108
California took an alternative approach and passed legislation
that allows a husband to rebut the marital presumption by requesting
a blood test within two years of the child’s birth.109 California adopted
the following rational:
[I]n the case of an older child the familial relationship between
the child and the man purporting to be the child’s father is consid-
erably more palpable than the biological relationship of actual pa-
ternity. A man who has lived with a child, treating it as his son or
daughter, has developed a relationship with the child that should
not be lightly dissolved and upon which liability for continued re-
sponsibility to the child might be predicated. This social relation-
ship is much more important, to the child at least, than a biological
relationship of actual paternity.110
California’s emphasis on the importance of the established pater-
nal relationship is so far-reaching that courts have used the above ra-
tionale in a line of cases that hold that a husband with no biological
ties to a child may be estopped from avoiding parental responsibilities
103. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1038(a)(2)(i) (West 2013).
104. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54(a) (West 2012).
105. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3119.961 and 3119.962 (West 2012).
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.10 (West 2012).
107. Kristen Santillo, Disestablishment of Paternity and The Future of Child Support Obliga-
tions, 37 FAM. L.Q. 503, 504 (2003).
108. See id.
109. In re Marriage of Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 443–44 (Ct. App. 1996) (discuss-
ing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(b) (West 2012)).
110. Id. at 445 (quoting William P. Hoffman, Jr., California’s Tangled Web: Blood Tests
and the Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy, 20 STAN. L. REV. 754 (1968)).
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even after the marriage to the child’s mother has ended.111 This line
of authority is limited to cases where the child relies on representa-
tions by the husband that he is the child’s biological father that are “of
such long continuance that it frustrates the realistic opportunity of
discovering the natural father and truly establishes the paternal rela-
tionship of the putative father and the child.”112
Accordingly, California courts found that the legislative intent be-
hind section 7541(b) of the Family Code sought for biology to control
determinations of paternity for a limited window of time, early in the
child’s life, and “thereafter the predominant consideration must be
the nature of the presumed father’s social relationship with the
child.”113 This rationale makes sense and a court’s ability to force a
father who had an established relationship with a child to continue his
support obligation cannot be denied. The power to enforce support
obligations, however, cannot also ensure a continuance of the inter-
personal relationship accorded so much weight.
If the court’s primary concern is the relationship between father
and son, it should consider alternative incentives that may encourage
a man to foster that relationship. The imposition of a monetary obli-
gation may create feelings of resentment and bitterness towards the
child and the mother and, in turn, may harm the relationship. A dises-
tablished father may maintain the longstanding relationship with the
child while the state seeks out the biological father for support. The
absence of an obligation for child support might actually prompt the
disestablished father to contribute both financial and emotional sup-
port out of genuine care.
II. Best Interest of the Child Standard
Upon dissolution of marriage or a custody dispute between two
legal parents, California courts consider the mother and father as
equally entitled to custody of their child and determine custody by
looking at what arrangement is in the child’s best interest.114 When
making orders regarding custody and visitation, California prioritizes
the health, safety, and welfare of the child in determining the best
111. See In re Marriage of Johnson, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121, 124 (Ct. App. 1979); In re Mar-
riage of Valle, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38, 42 (Ct. App. 1975); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr.
707, 708 (Ct. App. 1961).
112. Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447 (quoting Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 at 717).
113. Id. at 446.
114. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3010–11 (West 2012).
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interest of the child.115 The state also aims to ensure that children
have frequent and continuing contact with both parents once the rela-
tionship between the parents has ended.116
The court may also consider the spouses of the parents, the other
parent, and the nature and amount of contact with both parents.117
“If a party is absent . . . the court shall not consider the absence . . . as
a factor in determining custody . . . [when] the party . . . makes rea-
sonable efforts to maintain, regular contact with the child, and the
party’s behavior demonstrates no intent to abandon the child.”118
“The court may consider attempts by one party to interfere with the
other party’s regular contact with the child in determining if [a] party
has satisfied the requirements of” making reasonable efforts to main-
tain regular contact with a child.119
When a non-marital, biological father fails at his attempts to be-
come a presumed father under California law, he lacks standing in
court to bring his paternity claim and therefore loses any chance of
gaining legal rights over his child. This outcome deprives the court of
the ability to determine what arrangement serves the best interest of
the child. The marital presumption assumes that custody by the hus-
band of the child’s mother is in the best interest of the child, irrespec-
tive of the husband’s character, financial ability, family ties, or the
child’s interest in knowing his or her ancestry and extended biological
family.120
Under the California Family Code, when the marital presump-
tion is not applicable and a father is absent from the family residence,
the court will not consider that absence in the custody determination
if the mother interfered with the father’s visitation.121 Courts should
give the same consideration to non-marital, biological fathers when
the court assesses presumed fathers and their attempts at “receiving”
and “holding out.” This change would give the non-marital father
standing to press a claim and would enable the courts to conduct a
thorough inquiry into the best interest of the child.
115. Id. § 3020(a).
116. Id. § 3020(b).
117. Id. § 3011.
118. Id. § 3046(a)(1).
119. Id. at 3046(b).
120. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(a)(1) (West 2010 & Supp. 2012) (first preference for
awarding custody according to the best interest of the child is either joint custody to par-
ents or one parent); Id. § 3041(b) (burden of proof to find that parental custody would be
detrimental to the child is “clear and convincing evidence”).
121. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3046(b).
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Part of that inquiry should include the child’s right to know the
identity of their biological father. Courts in other states have articu-
lated the standard that a child has a right to know their biological
father’s identity.122 One court went as far as to say that children have a
“constitutionally protected interest [a due process right] in an accu-
rate determination” of parentage.123 A child’s interest in support, in-
heritance, and medical history from his biological father can be
broader than even the state’s interest in obtaining welfare support
payments.124 The Wyoming Supreme Court stated that “an accurate
determination of paternity results in intangible, psychological and
emotional benefits for the child, including familial bonds and learn-
ing cultural heritage.”125
Echoing that reasoning, a New Jersey court summarized a child’s
need to know his or her parentage:
One would expect that a child has a natural yearning to know his
true parentage. Every child has the need to feel rooted, to find
himself, and to know his true origins. When such knowledge is de-
nied the child may resort to fantasy to fill the void. As the links to
his past disappear with time, the search for his identity will become
more difficult. The anxiety to learn what was in his past may be
pathological, making it more difficult for the child to lead a useful
life and to form meaningful relationships.126
The same court went on to express the view that a child has a
profound right to know their father: “it is important that a child . . .
know who he is and from whence he came.”127
Elsewhere in the United States, courts have declared that when
making custody determinations, they must “balance the interests of all
parties involved, while keeping in mind that the child’s interests are
paramount.”128 Courts have considered a long list of factors, including
“the stability of the present home environment, the existence or lack
122. See, e.g., Jensen v. Runft, 843 P.2d 191, 193 (Kan. 1992) (quoting In re Marriage of
Ross, 783 P.2d 331, 335–36 (Kan. 1989)).
123. In re Calcaterra, 56 P.3d 1003, 1005 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
124. See, e.g., Ragin v. Lee, 829 A.2d 93, 97 n.7, 101 (Conn. 2003) (finding child’s inter-
est in identity of his biological father is sufficient to have standing to move to set aside
putative father’s default judgment of paternity in case seeking support from father, noting
recently enacted law granting children born out of wedlock rights of inheritance, and list-
ing child’s interest in an accurate family medical history).
125. Wyoming ex rel. NDB v. EKB, 35 P.3d 1224, 1228 n.7 (Wyo. 2001) (citing Hall v.
Lalli, 977 P.2d 776, 781 (Ariz. 1999)).
126. J.H. v. M.H., 426 A.2d 1073, 1075 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980) (quoting In re
Adoption by K., 222 A.2d 552, 554 (Bergen County Ct. 1966)).
127. M.A. v. Estate of A.C., 643 A.2d 1047, 1052 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993).
128. McDaniels v. Carlson, 738 P.2d 254, 262 (Wash. 1987).
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thereof of an ongoing family unit, the extent to which uncertainty of
parentage already exist in the child’s mind, and any other factors
which may be relevant in assessing the potential benefit or detriment
to the child.”129
Additional factors often considered by the courts have included
the child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs, the child’s past re-
lationship with the putative father, the child’s ability to ascertain ge-
netic information for the purpose of medical treatment and
genealogical history.130 Courts have also considered the rights and re-
lationships the child has through a presumed father that could be lost
by a determination of parentage and the desire of the biological fa-
ther to assume the responsibility of parenting his genetic child.131
The child’s best interests are further satisfied by knowing his fam-
ily medical history, and that is only possible if the child has a right to
know his biological father. As one court persuasively phrased it:
[C]ertain diseases are genetic in origin and may be passed on to
offspring. It may be critical to preserving [the child’s] health that
he have knowledge of potential diseases, illnesses, abnormalities,
birth defects or deficiencies which he may inherit from the dece-
dent and his forbearers. Moreover, knowing his natural genealogy
may provide [the child] and his physicians with potential sources
for blood transfusions, bone marrow and organ donor
transplants.132
Adopting a balancing test made up of multiple factors such as the
passage above suggests comports with California’s established “best in-
terest” approach. When applied to dissolution proceedings and cus-
tody determinations, a balancing test would give courts broader
discretion to protect the rights of all parties involved. Under this
framework, the child, biological parent, and marital parent would all
benefit since a more in-depth inquiry of the needs of the child would
yield a better result for the child. Currently, under California law a
child has no right to challenge paternity when the marital presump-
tion has been applied.133
III. Alternatives to the Marital Presumption
One alternative to the marital and non-marital father situation
would be the legal recognition of both of the individuals. In a recent
129. Id.
130. Turner v. Whisted, 607 A.2d 935, 940–41 (Md. 1991).
131. D.B.S. v. M.S., 888 P.2d 875, 877 (Kan. 1995).
132. M.A. v Estate of A.C., 643 A.2d 1047, 1052. (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993).
133. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989).
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California case, In re M.C.,134 parentage took center stage during a
dependency proceeding when the parentage of a child born into the
marriage of two women but conceived as a result of a premarital affair
with a man became an issue in a custody determination.135 The trial
court found that the child had three presumed parents, a biological
mother, a presumed mother under the marital presumption, and a
presumed father under receiving and holding out.136
The appellate court found there was sufficient evidence for the
trial court to have made this determination but remanded to the de-
pendency court to complete its analysis work and find only one pre-
sumed parent by “reconcil[ing] the competing presumptions to
determine which of them are founded on the weightier considera-
tions of policy and logic.”137 The appellate court pointed to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court’s rejection of the notion of dual paternity or
maternity where its recognition would result in three legal parents.138
In response to this case, Senate Bill 1476 was introduced in Sacra-
mento in 2012.139 The bill provided that the courts will have the dis-
cretion to recognize three parents if doing so would serve the best
interests of the child based on the nature, duration, and quality of the
presumed or claimed parents’ relationships with the child and the
benefit or detriment to the child of continuing those relationships.140
This bill would require the courts to allocate custody and visitation
rights among the three legal parents based on the best interest stan-
dard.141 The court would then divide child support obligations among
the parents based on the statewide guidelines already in place but ad-
justed to permit recognition of all three parents.142
The Senate passed the bill in late May but California’s Governor,
Jerry Brown, vetoed it.143 Governor Brown stated in his veto message
134. 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 2011).
135. Id. at 861.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 877.
138. Id. at 870.
139. See S.B. 1476, 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2012), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/
11-12/bill/sen/sb_1451-1500/sb_1476_bill_20120224_introduced.pdf.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Id.
143. Veto Message on Senate Bill 1476 from Governor Edmund Brown to the Members
of the California State Senate (Sep. 30, 2011), http://gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_1476_Veto_
Message.pdf.
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that while he was sympathetic to the author’s intentions, he needed to
take more time to consider all of the implications of this change.144
Another alternative for California—when a marital union is intact
and the marital presumption is applicable—would be to give a biologi-
cal father similar rights to that of a grandparent. In California, grand-
parents can petition the court for visitation rights if the child’s parents
are not married or if the child’s parents are separated.145 The test in
California’s grandparent visitation statute, if used in the context of a
natural father seeking visitation or custody of his child, would infringe
less on the marital union than if a biological father was given rights
equal to those given to the mother and her spouse.
Grandparents’ rights were in the spotlight in 2000 when a United
States Supreme Court decision struck down a Washington statute that
granted visitation rights to any person when visitation may be in the
best interests of the child.146 In that case, paternal grandparents
sought visitation with their grandchildren after the death of their son,
over the objections of the children’s mother.147 The Supreme Court
found the Washington statute “breathtakingly broad” because it al-
lowed for any person to petition the court for visitation at any time.148
The Court found that the Washington statute allowed the judicial
officer to ignore the “parent’s estimation of the child’s best inter-
ests[.]”149 This feature, as applied to the biological mother, unconsti-
tutionally infringed on her fundamental right as a parent to make
decisions concerning the “care, custody, and control” of her child.150
All fifty states, including California, now have their own grandpar-
ent visitation statutes that allow grandparents to petition the court for
visitation of their grandchildren.151 Upon reading the California
grandparent visitation statute, the underpinnings of the marital pre-
sumption appear instantaneously.152 The law provides that a petition
144. Id.
145. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104 (West 2012).
146. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
147. Id. at 60–61.
148. Id. at 67.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 66.
151. Michael Varela, Comment, All for the Love of a Child: The Current State of California’s
Grandparent Visitation Statute in Light of Troxel v. Granville, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 595, 596
n.3 (2004); see also, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. § 752.01 (2012);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607 (2012); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§§ 72, 240 (McKinney 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.051, 3109.11, 3109.12 (West
2012); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (West 2012).
152. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104 (West 2012).
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for visitation may not be filed while the natural or adoptive parents
are married unless “the parents are currently living separately and
apart on a permanent or indefinite basis.”153
Excluding the marital requirements, the California Family Code
provides that a grandparent of a minor child may be granted reasona-
ble visitation rights if the court: (1) finds there is a preexisting bond
between the grandparent and the grandchild such that visitation is in
the best interest of the child; and (2) balances the interests of the
child visited by the grandparents against the rights of the parents to
exercise their parental authority.154 This is a two-part inquiry and both
prerequisites must be present in order for a court to grant visitation
rights.
Furthermore, California Family Code section 3104 provides for a
rebuttable presumption that the “visitation of a grandparent is not in
the best interest of a minor child if the parent who has been awarded
sole legal and physical custody of the child in another proceeding . . .
objects to visitation by the grandparent.”155 The parent’s objection
shifts the burden to the grandparent to prove that visitation is in the
best interest of the child.
The California grandparent visitation statute has had to over-
come its own courtroom challenges. When a California court ordered
a five-year-old girl to fly unaccompanied from Utah to California to
visit her grandparents, the mother appealed the order on constitu-
tional grounds.156 The appeals process eventually worked its way to
the California Supreme Court where the court found the statute con-
stitutional because it sufficiently limited the situations and circum-
stances in which a grandparent of a minor child can petition the court
for visitation.157 The court’s decision distinguished the California stat-
ute from the Washington state statute that allowed anyone to petition
the court at any time.158
The court also concluded that the rebuttable presumption that
visitation is not in the best interest of the child adequately protected
the contesting parent’s due process rights.159 The court noted that the
problem in the Washington case was not that the court intervened,
153. Id. § 3104(b)(1).
154. Id. § 3104(a)(1)(2).
155. Id. § 3104(f) (emphasis added).
156. In re Marriage of Harris, 96 P.3d 141, 146 (Cal. 2004).
157. Id. at 151.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 151–52.
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but that it gave no “special weight” to the custodial parent’s determi-
nation of what was in her child’s best interest.160
California should apply a modified version of the grandparent
visitation test to biological fathers when the marital presumption de-
nies a biological father access to his child. In this context, the two-
pronged test should first require the existence of an established rela-
tionship between the biological father and child or evidence that the
father demonstrated a commitment to his parental responsibilities.
This would allow him to secure a visitation determination in the event
that the mother and husband prevented the establishment of his par-
ent-child relationship. Second, the interests of both the biological fa-
ther and his child in having a parent-child relationship would be
weighed against the rights of the contesting parent to exercise paren-
tal authority.
The rebuttable presumption that visitation is not in the best inter-
est of the child when the parent who was granted sole physical and
legal custody objects may be applicable as well. This presumption
would further safeguard the rights of parents granted legal custody to
exercise their parental authority. Even if the biological father bears
the additional burden of proof, he would still have his day in court
and a legal avenue to maintain a relationship with his child, some-
thing that is currently often denied. This way, the child’s relationship
with her father would be included in the court’s assessment of the
child’s best interest.
Either one of these alternatives is better than when marital ties
simply trump biology or vice versa. If biology takes precedence over all
other sources of a father-child relationship, then alleged biological fa-
thers would be able to assert their paternity rights over a child without
regard to whether or not the child was born into a marital relation-
ship or has been parented by another person for a substantial period
of time during the child’s minority.161 Alternatively, if at any point a
genetic test showed that a presumed father is not the biological father,
in the event of divorce or custody dispute, he could simply walk away
from parenting and child support obligations once the genetic test
results are known.162 A recognition of both biological and marital ties
would help to ensure a child is not left abandoned or completely igno-
rant of her lineage.
160. Id. at 150 (discussing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69).
161. Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption
of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 588 (2000).
162. Id.
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Rejection of any kind may cause a child to experience severe
emotional distress; whether it stems from a parent’s emotional dis-
tance or legal exile. California should aim to prevent this phenome-
non at all costs. Dependency proceedings witness a significant number
of parentage disputes wherein one or more of the available options
are not ideal. The children at the center of these proceedings could
benefit from an expansion of the rights of parents with a legal or bio-
logical tie and who seek to take responsibility for the child.163 The
best policy is one that accepts all those with either a marital or biologi-
cal tie to a child and who are willing to raise the child. Children will
benefit from the love, nurturing, and financial support that these par-
ties are eager to provide.
Conclusion
A biological parent does not automatically equate to a good par-
ent and a biological tie should not always trump a marital tie. More
specifically, the courts should not close their doors to biological fa-
thers seeking a parentage determination because they do not fit into
the presumed father category, especially when the mother and her
husband obstructed the biological father’s efforts to hold out and re-
ceive the child.
When a biological father voluntarily asserts his paternity out of a
desire to love, nurture and support his genetic offspring, the court
should always consider whether the child’s best interests are advanced
by: (1) a relationship with her biological father and extended family,
(2) remaining within the marital union family, or (3) a combination
of the two. It makes little sense to assume that a father’s access to his
child will gravely harm the marriage, particularly when the marriage
likely withstood the strain of the infidelity that produced the child.
One advantage of recognizing a biological parent as the legal fa-
ther is that it does not entail an absolute denial of the child to the
mother’s husband. When a biological father loses his parental rights,
he has no option but to wait until the child can seek him out to estab-
lish a relationship. Whereas a husband has some rights to the child as
a stepparent, if the court determines it is in the best interest of the
child to maintain that relationship and clearly, this only becomes an
issue when and if the husband and wife seek dissolution of their mar-
riage. If the marriage stays intact, the husband maintains an active
position as parent.
163. See, e.g., In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 861 (Ct. App. 2011).
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Recent advances in scientific technology have undermined the ra-
tionale for the marital presumption. California law must enter the
twenty-first century and protect both the biological father’s right to be
involved in raising his genetic descendants and the child’s right to
know his origin and extended family. The law should allot the same
weight to a parent’s right to know his offspring and ancestry as it ap-
portions to a child’s interest in being raised in a marital union. Biol-
ogy is not a necessary component of good parenting, but when a
biological parent seeks to assume responsibility for rearing his off-
spring, that gesture should not succumb to the concept of a marriage
that is as likely to fail as it is to succeed.
